We define the Repeat Offender Problem (ROP). Elsewhere, we have presented the first dynamic-sized lock-free data structures that can free memory to any standard memory allocator-even after thread failures-without requiring special support from the operating system, the memory allocator, or the hardware. These results depend on a solution to the ROP problem. Here we present the first solution to the ROP problem and its correctness proof. Our solution is implementable in most modern shared memory multiprocessors.
Introduction
This paper presents a mechanism for supporting memory management in dynamic-sized lockfree data structures (i.e., those that can grow and shrink). Lock-free data structures avoid many problems associated with the use of locking, including convoying, susceptibility to failures and delays, and, in real-time systems, priority inversion. A lock-free data structure guarantees that after a finite number of steps of any operation on the data structure, some operation completes. This definition precludes the use of locks to protect the data structure because a thread can take an unbounded number of steps without completing an operation if some other thread is delayed or fails while holding a lock that the first thread requires. The difficulty of designing lock-free data structures is reflected in numerous papers in the literature describing clever and subtle algorithms for implementing relatively mundane data structures such as stacks [13] , queues [10] , and linked lists [14, 5] .
We define an abstract problem-the Repeat Offender Problem (ROP)-such that any solution to this problem can be used by dynamic-sized lock-free data structure implementations to allow them to free unused memory with standard memory allocators. We have paid particular attention to formulating our problem to support one or more "worker" threads that do most of the work of memory management. This allows us to separate the scheduling of this work from that of the application. In particular, it allows us to use "spare" processors to do memory management work.
In this paper, we present the first solution to the ROP problem, which we call "Pass The Buck". Both the problem statement and our solution are quite involved, and the algorithm in particular is subtle and requires careful explanation (and a formal proof, which is included in an appendix). In a separate report [6] , we show how to apply ROP solutions to achieve the first 1 truly dynamicsized lock-free data structures, and evaluate their performance. In the remainder of this section, we discuss why dynamic-sized data structures are challenging to implement in a lock-free manner and then briefly summarize previous related work.
Before freeing an object that is part of a data structure (e.g., a node of a linked list), we must ensure that no thread will subsequently modify the object. Otherwise, a thread might corrupt an object allocated later that happens to reuse the memory used by the first object. Furthermore, in some systems, even read-only accesses of freed objects can be problematic: the operating system may remove the page containing the object from the thread's address space, causing a subsequent access to crash the program because the address is no longer valid [13] .
The use of locks makes it relatively easy to ensure that freed objects are not subsequently accessed because we can prevent access by other threads to (parts of) the data structure while removing objects from it. In contrast, without locks, multiple operations may access the data structure concurrently, and a thread cannot determine whether other threads are already committed to accessing the object that it wishes to free (this can only be ascertained by inspecting the stacks and registers of other threads). This is the root of the problem that our work aims to address.
Below we discuss various previous approaches for dealing with the problem described above. 2 One easy approach is to use garbage collection (GC). GC ensures that an object is not freed while any pointer to it exists, so threads cannot access objects after they are freed. This approach is especially attractive because recent experience (e.g., [2] ) shows that GC significantly simplifies the design of dynamic-sized lock-free data structures. However, GC is not available in all languages and environments, and in particular, we cannot rely on GC to implement GC.
Another common approach is to augment values in objects with version numbers or tags, and to access such values only through the use of compare-and-swap (CAS), such that if a CAS executes on an object after it has been deallocated, the value of the version number or tag will ensure that the CAS fails [13, 11, 12] . In this case, the version number or tag value must be carried with the object through deallocation and reallocation. A common approach for achieving this is to maintain explicit "freelists", which contain objects that are not currently in use [13, 11] . (In the remainder of the paper, we refer to freelists as "object pools" in order to avoid confusing "freeing" an object-by which we mean returning it to the memory allocator through the free library routine-with placing an object on a freelist.) In this approach, rather than freeing objects to the memory allocator when they are no longer required, we place them in an object pool from which new objects of the same type can be allocated later. An important disadvantage of this approach is that data structures implemented this way are not truly dynamic-sized: after they have grown large and subsequently shrunk, the object pool contains many objects that cannot be reused for other purposes, cannot be coalesced, etc. In [6] , we show how to eliminate the need for object pools from Michael and Scott's lock-free FIFO queue implementation using the results presented here. There are also various performance-related advantages to using object pools, rather than always allocating from and freeing to the memory allocator. We therefore also show in [6] how to construct object pools whose elements can be freed to the memory allocator. Thus, we show how to eliminate the major disadvantage of previous object pool approaches without sacrificing their advantages. We also present performance results in [6] that show that the overhead of making these data structures dynamic-sized is negligible in the absence of contention, and low in all cases. We believe these are the first dynamic-sized lock-free data structures that can continue to reclaim memory even after threads fail.
Valois [14] proposed another approach, in which the memory allocator maintains reference counts for objects to determine when they can be freed. Valois's approach allows the reference count of an object to be accessed even after the object has been released to the memory allocator. This behaviour restricts what the memory allocator can do with released objects. For example, the released objects cannot be coalesced. Thus, the disadvantages of maintaining explicit object pools are shared by Valois's approach. Furthermore, application designers sometimes need to switch between different memory allocation implementations for performance or other reasons. Valois's approach requires the memory allocator to support certain nonstandard functionality, and therefore restricts this possibility. Finally, the space overhead for per-object reference counts may be prohibitive. (In [3] , we proposed a similar approach that does allow memory allocators to be interchanged, but depends on double compare-and-swap (DCAS), which is not widely supported.)
Our goal is to provide support for the design of dynamic-sized lock-free data structures that can free objects to the memory allocator through standard interfaces (so memory allocators can be switched with ease), and can ensure that freed objects are not subsequently accessed (so it is safe for the memory allocator to unmap pages containing previously freed objects).
Interestingly, the previous work that comes closest to meeting this goal predates the work discussed above by almost a decade. Treiber [13] proposes a technique called obligation passing. 3 The instance of this technique for which Treiber presents specific details is in the implementation of a lock-free linked list supporting search, insert, and delete operations. This implementation allows freed nodes to be returned to the memory allocator through standard interfaces and without requiring any special functionality of the memory allocator. However, it employs a "use counter" such that memory is reclaimed only by the "last" thread to access the linked list in any period. As a result, this implementation can be prevented from ever recovering any memory by a failed thread (which defeats one of the main purposes of using lock-free implementations). Another disadvantage of this implementation is that the obligation passing code is bundled together with the linked-list maintenance code (all of which is presented in assembly code). Because it is not clear what aspects of the linked-list code the obligation passing code depends on, it is difficult to apply this technique to other situations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we define ROP, and discuss some of the issues and trade-offs we faced in specifying the problem. In Section 3, we present the Pass The Buck algorithm. Concluding remarks appear in Section 4. A formal correctness proof for the Pass The Buck algorithm is presented in an appendix.
The Repeat Offender Problem
In this section, we specify the Repeat Offender Problem (ROP). We consider a set of values, each of which can be free, injail, or escaping. Initially, all values are free. We further consider a set of application clients that interact with an ROP solution as described below. An application-dependent external Arrest action can cause a free value to become injail at any time. A client can help injail values to begin escaping, which causes them to become escaping. Values that are escaping can finish escaping and become free again. Clients can use values, but must never use a value that is free. A client can attempt to prevent a value v from escaping while it is being used by "posting a guard" on v. However, if the guard is posted too late, it may fail to prevent v from escaping. Thus, in order to safely use v, a client first posts a guard on v, and then checks to see if v is still injail. 4 If so, then an ROP solution is required to ensure that v does not escape before the guard is stood down or posted elsewhere.
Our motivation is to use ROP solutions to allow threads (clients) to avoid dereferencing (using) a pointer (value) to an object that has been freed. In this context, an injail pointer is one that has been allocated (arrested) since it was last freed, and can therefore be used.
To support these interactions, ROP solutions provide the following procedures. A thread posts a guard g on a value v by invoking PostGuard(g,v); this removes the guard from any value it previously guarded. (A special null value is used to stand down the guard, that is, to remove the guard from the previously guarded value without posting the guard on a new value). A thread helps a set of values S to begin escaping by invoking Liberate(S); the application must ensure that each value in S is injail before this call, and the call causes each value to become escaping. The Liberate procedure returns a (possibly different) set of escaping values causing them to be liberated (each of these values becomes free on the return of this procedure). These transitions are summarized in Figure 1 . Finally, a thread can check whether a value v is injail by invoking IsInJail(v); if this invocation returns true, then v was injail at some point during the invocation 5 (the converse is not necessarily true, as explained later). An ROP solution does not implement the functionality of the Arrest action-this is application-specific-but ROP must be aware of arrests to know when a free value becomes injail.
If a guard g is posted on a value v, and v is injail at some time t after g is posted on v and before g is subsequently stood down or reposted on a different value, then we say that g traps v from time t until g is stood down or reposted. The operational specification of the main correctness condition for ROP is that it does not allow a value to escape (i.e., become free) while it is trapped.
The above description of ROP omitted some important but mundane details. We now discuss these details and then present a formal specification of ROP that includes them. First, we did not describe how clients choose guards to post on values. In some applications (an example is presented in [6] ), it is necessary for one client to guard multiple values at the same time, so simply having one guard per client is not sufficient. We therefore allow clients to hire and fire guards. Guards are hired by invoking the HireGuard procedure and are fired by invoking the FireGuard procedure. A client may not post, stand down or fire a guard that it does not currently employ. An ROP solution is required to ensure that a guard is never simultaneously employed by multiple clients.
The above description should be sufficient for a basic understanding of ROP; a precise formulation of ROP is given by the I/O automaton shown in Figure 2 , explained below. (See [8] for details of the I/O automata model.) We begin by adopting some notational conventions.
Notational conventions: Unless otherwise specified, p and q denote clients (threads) from P, the set of all clients (threads); g denotes a guard from G, the set of all guards; v denotes a value from V, the set of all values, and S and T denote sets of values (i.e., subsets of V). We assume that V contains a special null value that is never used, arrested or liberated.
The automaton consists of a set of environment actions and a set of ROP output actions. Each action consists of a precondition for performing the action and the effect on state variables of performing the action. Most environment actions are invocations of ROP operations and are paired with corresponding ROP output actions that represent the system's response to the invocations. In particular, the PostInv p (g, v) action models client p invoking PostGuard(g,v), and the PostResp p () action models the completion of this procedure. The HireInv p () action models client p invoking HireGuard(), and the corresponding HireResp p (g) action models the system assigning guard g to p. The FireInv p (g) action models client p calling FireGuard(g), and the FireResp p () action models the completion of this procedure. The LiberateInv p (S) action models client p calling Liberate(S) to help the values in S begin escaping, and the LiberateResp p (T ) action models the completion of this procedure with a set of values T that have finished escaping. Finally, the Arrest(v) action models the environment arresting value v.
The state variable status [v] records the current status of value v, which can be free, injail, or escaping. Transitions between the status values are caused by calls to and returns from ROP procedures, as well as by the application-specific Arrest action, as described above. The post variable maps each guard to the value (if any) it currently guards. The pc p variable models control flow of client p, for example ensuring that p does not invoke a procedure before the previous invocation completes; pc p also encodes parameters passed to the corresponding procedures in some cases. The guards p variable represents the set of guards currently employed by client p. The numescaping variable is an auxiliary variable used to specify nontriviality properties, as discussed later. Finally, trapping maps each guard g to a boolean value that is true iff g has been posted on some value v and has not subsequently been reposted or stood down, and at some point since the guard was posted on v, v has been injail (i.e., it captures the notion of guard g trapping the value on which it has been posted). This is used by the LiberateResp action to determine whether v can be returned.
(Recall that a value should not be returned if it is trapped.)
Preconditions on the invocation actions specify assumptions about the circumstances under which the application invokes the corresponding ROP procedures. Most of these preconditions are mundane well-formedness conditions such as the requirement that a client posts only guards that it currently employs. The precondition for LiberateInv captures the assumption that the application passes only injail values to Liberate, and the precondition for the Arrest action captures the assumption that only free values are arrested. The application designer must determine how these guarantees are made.
Preconditions on the response actions specify the circumstances under which the ROP procedures can return. Again, most of these preconditions are quite mundane and straightforward. The interesting case is the precondition of LiberateResp, which states that Liberate can return a value only if it has been passed to (some invocation of) Liberate, it has not subsequently been returned by (any invocation of) Liberate, and no guard g has been continually guarding the value since it was last injail (recall that this is captured by trapping[g]).
Desirable properties
As specified so far, an ROP solution in which Liberate always returns the empty set, or simply does not terminate, is correct. Clearly, in contexts such as that motivating our work, such solutions are unacceptable: each escaping value represents a resource that will be reclaimed only when the value is liberated (returned by some invocation of Liberate). One might be tempted to specify that every value passed to a Liberate operation is eventually returned by some Liberate operation. However, without special operating system support, it is not possible to guarantee such a strong property in the face of failing threads. We do not attempt here to specify the "correct" nontriviality condition, as we do not want to unduly limit the range of solutions. Instead, we discuss some properties that might be useful in specifying nontriviality properties for proposed solutions.
The state variable numescaping counts the number of values that are currently escaping (i.e., that have been passed to some invocation of Liberate and have not subsequently been returned from any invocation of Liberate). If we require a solution to ensure that numescaping is bounded by some function of application-specific quantities, we exclude the trivial solution in which Liberate always returns the empty set. However, because this bound necessarily depends on the number of concurrent Liberate operations and the number of values with which each Liberate operation is invoked, it does not exclude the solution in which Liberate never returns.
A combination of a boundedness requirement and some form of progress requirement on Liberate operations seems to be the most appropriate way to specify the nontriviality requirement. We later prove that the Pass The Buck algorithm provides a bound on numescaping that depends on the number of concurrent Liberate operations. Because the bound (necessarily) depends on the number of concurrent Liberate operations, if an unbounded number of threads fail while executing Liberate, then an unbounded number of values can be escaping. We emphasize, however, that our implementation does not allow failed threads to prevent values from being freed in the future, as Treiber's approach does [13] .
Our Pass The Buck algorithm has two more desirable properties. First, the Liberate operation is wait-free (that is, it completes after a bounded number of steps, regardless of the timing behaviour of other threads). This is useful because it allows us to calculate an upper bound on the amount of time Liberate will take to execute, which is useful in determining how to schedule Liberate work.
Finally, our algorithm has a property we call value progress. Roughly, this property guarantees that, unless a thread fails, a value does not remain escaping forever provided Liberate is invoked "enough" times.
Modular decomposition
A key contribution of this paper is the insight that an effective way to solve ROP in practice is to separate the implementation of the IsInJail operation from the others. The reason is that, in our experience using ROP solutions to implement dynamic-sized lock-free data structures [6] , values are used in a manner that allows threads to efficiently determine whether a value is injail with sufficient accuracy for the particular application. As a concrete example, when values represent pointers to objects that are part of a concurrent data structure, these values become injail (allocated) before the objects they refer to become part of the data structure, and are removed from the data structure before being passed to Liberate. Thus, simply observing that an object is still part of a data structure is sufficient to conclude that a pointer to it is injail.
Because we intend ROP solutions to be used with application-specific implementations of the IsInJail operation, the specification of this operation is somewhat weak: an implementation of IsInJail that always returns false meets the specification. However, this implementation would be useless, usually because it would not guarantee the required progress properties of the application that uses it. Because the circumstances under which IsInJail can and should return true¡ depend on the application, we retain the weak specification of IsInJail, and leave it to application designers to provide implementations of IsInJail that are sufficiently strong for their applications. (Note that an integrated, application-independent implementation of this operation, while possible, would be expensive: it would have to monitor and synchronize with all actions that potentially affect the status of each value.)
This proposed modular decomposition suggests the following methodology for implementing dynamic-sized lock-free objects: Use an "off-the-shelf" implementation of an ROP solution for the HireGuard, FireGuard, PostGuard, and Liberate operations, and then exploit specific knowledge of the application to design an optimized implementation of IsInJail. More precisely, we decompose the ROP I/O automaton into two component automata: the ROPlite automaton, and the InJail automaton. ROPlite has the same environment and output actions as ROP, except for IsInJailInv and IsInJailResp. InJail has input action IsInJailInv and output action IsInJailResp. In addition, the InJail automaton "eavesdrops" on ROPlite: all environment and output actions of ROPlite are input actions of InJail (though in many cases the implementation of the InJail automata will ignore these inputs because it can determine whether a value is injail without them, as discussed above).
We present our Pass The Buck algorithm, which implements ROPlite in a simple and practical way, in Section 3.
Issues and tradeoffs in specifying ROP
We could have rolled the functionality of hiring and firing guards into the PostGuard operation. We kept this functionality separate in order to allow implementations to make the PostGuard operation as efficient as possible, as this is the most common operation. This separation allows the implementation more flexibility in how it manages resources associated with guards because the cost of hiring and firing guards can be amortized over many PostGuard operations.
In some applications, it may be desirable to be able to quickly "mark" a value for liberation, without doing any of the work of liberating the value. (Consider, for example, an interactive system in which user threads should not execute relatively high-overhead "administrative" work such as liberating values, but additional processor(s) may be available to perform such work.) We did not model such an operation, as it is straightforward to communicate such values to a worker thread that invokes Liberate-the ROP solution does not need to know anything about this.
One Solution: Pass The Buck
In this section, we describe one ROP solution. Our primary goal when designing this solution was to minimize the performance penalty to the application when no values are being liberated. That is, the PostGuard operation should be implemented as efficiently as possible, perhaps at the cost of a more expensive Liberate operation. Such solutions are desirable for at least two reasons. First, PostGuard is necessarily invoked by the application, so its performance always impacts application performance. On the other hand, Liberate work can be done by a spare processor, or by a background thread, so that it does not directly impact application performance. Second, solutions that optimize PostGuard performance are desirable for scenarios in which values are liberated infrequently, but we must retain the ability to liberate them. An example is the implementation of a dynamic-sized data structure that uses an object pool to avoid allocating and freeing objects under "normal" circumstances but can free elements of the object pool when it grows too large. In this case, no liberating is necessary while the size of the data structure is relatively stable. With this goal in mind, we describe our Pass The Buck algorithm below, after some preliminaries.
Preliminaries:
Our algorithm is presented in a C/C++-like pseudocode style, and should be self-explanatory. For convenience, we assume a shared-memory multiprocessor with sequentially consistent memory [7] . 6 We further assume that the multiprocessor supports a compare-and-swap (CAS) instruction that accepts three parameters: an address, an expected value, and a new value. The CAS instruction atomically compares the contents of the address to the expected value, and, if they are equal, stores the new value at the address and returns true. If the comparison fails, no changes are made to memory, and the CAS instruction returns false.
The Pass The Buck algorithm is shown in Figure 3 . The GUARDS array is used to allocate guards to threads. Here we assume a bound MG on the number of guards simultaneously employed; it is straightforward to remove this restriction. The POST array consists of one location per guard, which holds the value the guard is currently assigned to guard if one exists, and null otherwise. The HNDOFF array is used by Liberate to "hand off" responsibility for a value to a later Liberate operation if the value cannot be liberated immediately because it has been trapped by a guard.
The HireGuard and FireGuard procedures essentially implement long-lived renaming; we use 6 We have implemented our algorithms for SPARC R -based machines providing only TSO (Total Store Ordering) [15] -a memory model that is slightly weaker than sequential consistency-which required additional memory barrier instructions to be included in places.
the renaming algorithm presented in [1] . Specifically, for each guard g, we maintain an entry GUARDS[g], which is initially false. Thread p hires guard g by atomically changing GUARDS[g] from false (unemployed) to true (employed); p attempts this with each guard in turn until it succeeds (lines 2 and 3). The FireGuard procedure simply sets the guard back to false (line 7). The HireGuard procedure also maintains the shared variable MAXG, which is used by the Liberate procedure to determine how many guards to consider. Liberate considers every guard for which a HireGuard operation has completed. Therefore, it suffices to have each HireGuard operation ensure that MAXG is at least the index of the guard returned. This is achieved with the simple loop at lines 4 and 5.
PostGuard is implemented as a single store of the value to be guarded in the specified guard's POST entry (line 9), in accordance with our goal of making PostGuard as efficient as possible.
The most interesting part of the Pass The Buck algorithm lies in the Liberate procedure. Recall that Liberate should return a set of values that have been passed to Liberate and have not since been returned by Liberate (i.e., escaping values), subject to the constraint that Liberate cannot return a value that has been continuously guarded by the same guard since some point when it was injail (i.e., Liberate must not return trapped values).
Because we want the Liberate operation to be wait-free, if some guard g is guarding a value v in the value set of some thread p executing Liberate, then p must either determine that g is not trapping v or remove v from p's value set before returning that set. To avoid losing values, any value that p removes from its set must be stored somewhere so that, when the value is no longer trapped, another Liberate operation may pick it up and return it. The interesting details of the Pass The Buck algorithm concern how threads determine that a value is not trapped, and how they store values while keeping space overhead for stored values low. Below we explain the Liberate procedure in more detail, paying particular attention to these issues.
The loop at lines 12 through 31 iterates over all guards ever hired. For each guard, if p cannot determine for some value v in its set that v is not trapped, then p attempts to "hand off" that value (there can be at most one such value per guard). If p succeeds in doing so (line 18), it removes v from its set (line 19) and proceeds to the next guard (lines 21 and 31). Also, as explained in more detail below, p might simultaneously pick up a value handed off previously by another Liberate operation, in which case this value can be shown not to be trapped by that guard, so p adds this value to its set (line 20). If p fails to hand v off, then it retries. If it fails repeatedly, it can be shown that v is not trapped by that guard, so p can move on to the next guard without removing v from its set (lines 23 and 25). When p has examined all guards (see line 12), it can safely return any values remaining in its set (line 32).
We describe the processing of each guard in more detail below. First, however, we present a central property of the correctness proof of this algorithm, which will aid the presentation that follows; this lemma is quite easy to see from the code and the high-level description given thus far; it is formalized in Invariant 12 of the correctness proof given in the appendix.
Single Location Lemma:
Each escaping value v is stored at a single guard or is in the value set of a single Liberate operation (but not both). Also, only escaping values are in any of these locations.
The processing of each guard g proceeds as follows: At lines 15 and 16, p determines whether the value currently guarded by g (if any)-call it v-is in its set. If so, p executes the loop at lines 17 through 26 in order to either determine that v is not trapped, or to remove v from its set. In order to avoid losing v in the latter case, p "hands off" v by storing it in the HNDOFF array.
(Each entry of this array consists of a value and a version number. The latter is incremented with each modification of the entry for reasons that will become clear later. As is usual with version numbers, we assume that enough bits are used for the version numbers that "wraparound" is impossible in practice; see [12] for discussion and justification.) Because there is at most one value that is potentially trapped by guard g at any time, a single location HNDOFF [g] 
.) While this explanation gives the basic idea of our algorithm, it is somewhat oversimplified, as there are various subtle race conditions that must be avoided. We explain how the algorithm deals with these race conditions in more detail below.
To hand v off, p uses a CAS operation to attempt to replace the value previously stored in HNDOFF[g] with v (line 18); this ensures that, upon success, p knows which value it replaced, so it can add that value to its set (line 20). We explain later why it is safe to do so. If the CAS fails due to a concurrent Liberate operation, then p rereads HNDOFF[g] (line 24) and loops around to retry the handoff. There are various conditions under which we break out of this loop and move on to the next guard. (Note in particular that the loop completes after at most three CAS attempts; see lines 13, 22, and 23. Thus our algorithm is wait-free.) We explain later why it is safe to stop trying to hand off v in each of these cases. Before doing so, we explain one more aspect of the algorithm.
As described so far, p picks up a value from HNDOFF[g] only if its value set contains a value that is guarded by guard g. Therefore, without some additional mechanism, it would be quite possible for a value to be stored in HNDOFF[g] and never be picked up from there. This would violate the value progress property discussed in Section 2. To avoid this problem, even if p does not need to remove a value from its set, it still picks up the previously handed off value (if any) by replacing it with null (see lines 28 through 30).
We now consider each of the ways p can break out of the loop at lines 17 through 26, and explain why it is safe to do so. We first consider the case in which p exits the loop due to a successful CAS at line 18. In this case, as described earlier, p removes v from its set (line 19), adds the previous value in HNDOFF[g] to its set (line 20), and moves on to the next guard (lines 21 and 31). An important part of understanding our algorithm is to understand why it is safe to take the previous value-call it w-of HNDOFF[g] to the next guard. The reason is that we read POST[g] (line 15 or 26) between reading HNDOFF[g] (line 14 or 24) and attempting the CAS at line 18. Because each modification to HNDOFF[g] increments its version number field, it follows that w was in HNDOFF[g] when p read POST[g]. Also, recall that w = v in this case. Therefore, when p read POST[g], w was not guarded by g. Furthermore, because w remained in HNDOFF [g] from that moment until the CAS, w cannot become trapped in this interval (because a value can become trapped only while it is injail, and all values in the HNDOFF array and in the sets of Liberate operations are escaping). The same argument explains why it is safe to pick up the value replaced by null at line 29.
It remains to consider how p can break out of the loop without performing a successful CAS. In each case, p can infer that v is not trapped by g, so it can give up on its attempt to hand off v. If p breaks out of the loop at line 26, then v is not trapped by g at that moment simply because it is not even guarded by g. The other two cases (lines 23 and 25) occur only after a certain number of times around the loop, implying a certain number of failed CAS's.
To see why we can infer that v is not trapped in each of these two cases, consider the timing diagram in Figure 4 . (For the rest of this section, we use the notation v p to indicate the value of We consider two cases. First, suppose (H) is an execution of line 18 by q 1 . In this case, between (I) and (H), q 1 read POST[g] = v q 1 , either at line 15 or at line 26; call this read (L). By the Single Location Lemma, because v p is in p's set, the read at L implies that v p was not guarded by g at (L). Therefore, v p was not trapped by g at (L), which implies that it is safe for p to break out of the loop after (D) in this case (observe that attempts p = 2 in this case).
it (G). (The arrows between (A) and (G) and between (G) and (B) indicate that we know (G) comes after (A) and before (B).) Similarly, some thread q 1 executes a successful CAS on HNDOFF[g] after (C) and before (D)-call it (H); and some thread q 2 executes a successful CAS on HNDOFF[g] after (E) and before (F)-call it (I). (Note that threads
For the second case, suppose (H) is an execution of line 29 by thread q 1 . In this case, because q 1 is storing null instead of a value in its own set, the above argument does not work. However, because p breaks out of the loop at line 25 only if it reads a non-null value from HNDOFF[g] at line 24, it follows that if p does so, then some successful CAS stored a non-null value to HNDOFF[g] at or after (H), and in this case the above argument can be applied to that CAS to show that v p was not trapped. If p reads null at line 24 after (D), then it continues through its next loop iteration.
In this case, there is a successful CAS (I) that comes after (H). Because (H) stored null in the current case, no subsequent execution of line 29 by any thread will succeed before the next successful execution of the CAS in line 18 by some thread. To see why, observe that the CAS at line 29 never succeeds while HNDOFF[g] contains null (see line 28). Therefore, for (I) to exist, there is a successful execution of the CAS at line 18 by some thread after (H) and at or before (I). Using this CAS, we can apply the same argument as before to conclude that v p was not trapped. This argument is formalized in an appendix. It is easy to see that our ROP solution is wait-free.
Our algorithm also satisfies the value progress property described in Section 2. Briefly, this is because a value cannot remain handed off at a particular guard forever if Liberate is executed enough times. Specifically, a value v is handed off at guard g, then the first Liberate operation to begin processing guard g after v is not trapped by g will ensure that v is picked up and taken to the next guard (or returned from Liberate if g is the last guard), either by that Liberate operation or some concurrent Liberate operation.
As stated earlier, Michael [9] has independently and concurrently developed a solution to a very similar problem. Michael's algorithm buffers to-be-freed values so that it can control the number of values passed to Scan (his equivalent of the Liberate operation) at a time. This has the disadvantage that there are usually O(GP) values that could potentially be freed, but are not (where G is the number of "hazard pointers"-the equivalent of guards-and P is the number of participating threads). However, this technique allows him to achieve a nice amortized bound on time spent per value freed. He also has weaker requirements for Scan than we have for Liberate; in particular, Scan can return some values to the buffer if they cannot yet be freed. This admits a very simple solution that uses only read and write primitives (recall that ours requires CAS), and allows several optimizations. However, it also means that if a thread terminates while values remain in its buffer, then those values will never be freed, so his algorithm does not satisfy the value progress property. This is undesirable because a single value might represent a large amount of resources, which would never be reclaimed in this case. The number of such values is bounded by O(GP). We can perform the same optimizations and achieve the same amortized bound under normal operation, while still retaining the value progress property (although we would require threads to invoke a special wait-free operation before terminating to achieve this). In this case, our algorithm would perform almost identically to Michael's (with a slight increase in overhead upon thread termination), but would of course share the disadvantages discussed above, except for the lack of value progress.
In [6] we present a dynamic-sized lock-free FIFO queue achieved by applying our ROP solution (without the optimizations discussed above) to the non-dynamic-sized implementation of Michael and Scott [11] together with the non-dynamic-sized freelist of Treiber [13] . Performance experiments presented in that paper show that the overhead of the dynamic-sized FIFO queue over the non-dynamic-sized one of [11] is negligible in the absence of contention, and low in all cases.
Michael has shown how to apply his technique to achieve dynamic-sized implementations of a number of different data structures, including queues, double-ended queues, list-based sets, and hash tables (see [9] for references). Because the interfaces and safety properties of our approaches are almost identical, those results can all be achieved using any ROP solution too. In addition, using the one presented here would allow us to achieve value progress in those implementations. Michael also identified a small number of implementations to which his method is not applicable. In some cases, this may be because Michael's approach is restricted to use a fixed number of hazard pointers per thread; in contrast, ROP solutions provide for dynamic allocation of guards. Furthermore, in [6] , we have presented a general methodology based on any ROP solution that can be applied to achieve dynamic-sized versions of these data structures too. This methodology is based on reference counts, and therefore shares the disadvantages thereof, including space and time overhead for reference counts, as well as the need to deal with cyclic garbage.
Concluding Remarks
We have defined the Repeat Offender Problem (ROP), and presented one solution to this problem. Such solutions provide a mechanism for supporting memory management in dynamic-sized lockfree data structures. The utility of this mechanism has been demonstrated elsewhere [6] , where we present what we believe are the first dynamic-sized lock-free data structures that can continue to reclaim memory even if some threads fail (although Maged Michael [9] has independently and concurrently achieved such implementations, as discussed in Section 3).
By specifying the ROP as an abstract and general problem, we allow for the possibility of using different solutions for different applications and settings, without the need to redesign or reverify the data structure implementations that employ ROP solutions. We have paid particular attention to allowing much of the work of managing dynamically allocated memory to be done concurrently with the application, using additional processors if they are available.
The ideas in this paper came directly from insights gained and questions raised in our work on lock-free reference counting [3] . This further demonstrates the value of research that assumes stronger synchronization primitives than are currently widely supported.
Future work includes exploring other ROP solutions, and applying ROP solutions to the design of other lock-free data structures. It would be particularly interesting to explore the various ways for scheduling Liberate work.
A Formal Proof that PTB Implements ROPlite
In this appendix, we give a formal proof that the Pass The Buck algorithm (PTB) of Section 3 implements ROPlite, that is, it solves the Repeat Offender Problem except that it does not provide an IsInJail operation.
To prove that PTB implements ROPlite, we first define an I/O automaton model [8] for the PTB algorithm and then show that this automaton implements the ROP automaton in Section 2 (without the IsInJailInv and IsInJailResp actions).
The PTB automaton appears in Figures 5, 6 and 7 . It has the same environment actions and output actions as the ROP automaton in Figure 2 except that it does not have the IsInJailInv and IsInJailResp actions because PTB does not implement the IsInJail operation.
The PTB automaton also has internal actions that model the execution of code that implements the operations. Because an action changes the state of the automaton atomically, each action corresponds to code that includes at most one access to shared variables. (Access to local variables always appears atomic because other threads cannot see the effects of such access.) The names of the internal actions indicate the lines of the code that implement them in Figure 3 . For line2-3 p , an occurrence of the action corresponds to a single iteration of the while loop. Not all lines of code are modelled by internal actions: Lines 1 and 11 are collapsed into the invocation actions because they access only local variables, and lines 6, 8, 10 and 32 are modelled by the response actions. We discuss the internal actions of Liberate in more detail below.
The PTB automaton specified here can be viewed as the composition of two subautomata, representing the environment and the PTB algorithm, and the state variables defined in Figure 5 can be partitioned between these subautomata. The environment state variables are exactly the variables of the ROP automaton. These variables are used to determine when the environment actions are enabled. The internal PTB state variables represent state used by the PTB algorithm. These consist of the shared global variables GUARDS, POST, HNDOFF and MAXG; the local variables (including the parameters) of each operation; and a local program counter ln p that records the next line of code to be executed by thread p.
The environment actions of the PTB automaton are identical to their counterparts in the ROP automaton except that they may also set some local variables. The response actions are enabled by the value of the local program counter being equal to the line number corresponding to a return statement. They set the program counter to idle and modify the environment state variables in the same way as the ROP automaton does. 7 Like the response actions, the internal PTB actions are enabled by the local program counter having the appropriate line number, and their effects clauses straightforwardly express the effects of executing the corresponding lines of code.
In addition to the environment assumptions expressed in the ROP automaton, the PTB algorithm assumes that the number of guards simultaneously employed (including those in the midst of being hired or fired) is bounded by MG; the set G of guards is {0, . . . , MG − 1}. Failure to satisfy this assumption may result in an attempt at line 2 to write beyond the end of the POST array, possibly overwriting unrelated data structures and causing arbitrary failures. As in the code in Figure 3 , we simply assume that this does not happen; we do not specify the behavior of the 
Figure 6: Transitions for the PTB automaton, part 1: All but Liberate. automaton when i p ≥ MG in the execution of either line2-3 p or line7 p .
We now prove several invariants and lemmas about the PTB automaton. Of these, Invariants 1, 2, 12 and 18 are the ones actually used in the proof of Theorem 1, which says that PTB implements ROPlite. The rest are used to prove Invariants 12 and 18. Informally, Invariant 1 says that pc p has the appropriate value when p is executing a PTB operation. Invariant 2 says that every guard is employed by at most one thread, and that if g is employed then GUARDS[g] = true. 8 Invariant 12 says that the escaping values are those that appear in the HNDOFF array or in the vs p set of some thread p with pc p = liberate, and that each escaping value appears in exactly one of these locations. Invariant 18 says that if a guard g traps a value v and v is in the vs p set of some thread executing Liberate, then that thread has not yet finished processing g.
We prove most invariants by induction on the number of transitions in an execution. That is, we prove that the invariant holds in the initial state and that for each reachable state s, if the invariant holds in s and s a − → s then the invariant holds in s . For many of the invariants, checking this is straightforward, and we omit the details of the proof. Because we assume s (and thus s ) is reachable, we can assume the earlier invariants hold in s and s in the proofs of later invariants. Proof: This invariant holds initially because guards p is empty and ln p = idle for all p and ¬GUARDS[g] for all g. Suppose that the invariant holds in s and that s a − → s . Let S p be {i p } if ln p ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7} and ∅ otherwise. The only actions that change any of the sets listed in the invariant are line2-3 p for some p with ¬s.GUARDS[s.i p ], HireResp p (g) and FireInv p (g) for some p and g, and line7 p for some p. In each case, one guard is removed from one set and added to another, so the invariant is preserved. For HireResp p (g), g = s.i p , s.ln p = 6 and s .ln p = idle, so g is removed from S p and added to guards p .
Invariant 1 If ln
For FireInv p (g), g is removed from guards p and added to S p .
Finally, for line7 p , s.i p is removed from S p and added to {g :
Invariant 3 For all p, ln p ∈ {9, 10} =⇒ i p ∈ guards p .
Proof: Straightforward by induction.

Invariant 4
For all p and q, if ln p ∈ {9, 10} and ln q ∈ {9, 10} then i p = i q .
Proof:
Immediate from Invariants 2 and 3. 8 To make it provable by induction, the actual invariant is strengthened slightly. This is also true for Invariant 18. We now prove the main theorem, which says that PTB implements ROPlite (assuming a wellbehaved environment). This proof uses a special case of the simulation relation, or refinement, method [8] .
Theorem 1
The PTB automaton (including the environment part) implements the ROP automaton (including the environment part).
Proof:
We can prove that one automaton A implements another automaton B with the same input and output actions (but different internal actions) by giving a function f from the states of A to the states of B that satisfies the following properties: The existence of such a function, called a refinement or a simulation, implies that A implements B [8] . 9 Because the state variables of the ROP automaton are exactly the environment state variables of the PTB automaton, we simply use the function that maps states of the PTB automaton to the states of the ROP automaton with identical values for those state variables. The first property above is satisfied because the environment state variables are initialized to the same values in both automata.
Suppose that s is a reachable state of the PTB automaton and s a − → s . If a is an internal action, then f(s ) = f(s) because the internal actions do not modify any of the environment state variables.
If a is an environment action then the precondition of a is identical in the two automata and the environment state variables are updated in the same way by both automata, so f(s) a − → f(s ), as required.
For the PTB output actions, we need to argue that a is enabled in f(s) and that both automata update the environment state variables in the same way. For HireResp, FireResp and LiberateResp actions, the latter is obvious because the statements of the effects clause that affect the environment state variables are identical.
For HireResp p (g), s.ln p = 6 and s.i p = g, so by Invariant 1, s.pc p = hire, and by Invariant 2, g / ∈ q s.guards q .
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